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In 1973, the Philippine government started a project to build a series of 
hydro-electric dams in the Chico River of the Cordillera, a region inhabited 
by the so-called indigenous Igorots. There was immediate opposition in 
those villages where exploration work for the dams started. Villagers tore 
down the camps of the exploration teams, and sought the help of local 
priests to write petitions to President Marcos asking him to relocate the 
dams in another area. This localized protest turned out to be the beginning 
of a social movement for regional autonomy. 
This chapter aims to trace how the social movement that emerged from 
resistance to the Chico dams acquired its shape. How did it transcend local 
opposition, and why did it become a movement towards regional auton-
omy rather than blend into the national movement against the Marcos 
dictatorship that simultaneously swept over the country? 
The discussion will address key issues pertinent to social movement 
theory. It will focus, in particular, on processes of discourse formation, or 
'framing,' in the Cordillera movement. How did a problem that con-
fronted certain villages in the Cordillera come to be defined as a regional, 
'indigenous' issue to which a large number of people committed them-
selves, even though the problem did not affect them directly? In exploring 
this question, I contend that collective action discourses are not products 
in the sense of engineered montages. Literally 'un-authorized,' they are 
knowledge constructions that emerge from negotiation processes involving 
different groups of actors. As the first part of the chapter shows, this leads 
to a more dynamic treatment of the distinction that most social movement 
theory maintains between different categories of actors, such as 'insiders' 
and 'outsiders,' or 'movement entrepreneurs' and 'participants.' 
In the second place, I want to show how discourse formation is inextri-
cably linked to issues of power and control. Action frames are sometimes 
understood as functional devices. They define an issue in a way that 
people can identify with, and contain possibilities for action for which 
people can mobilize. However, if framing processes are understood as 
negotiated processes, this opens the door to analyzing how the 
contestation of frames is linked to power struggles. The stakes in struggles 
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over definitions are not formed by the definitions themselves, but by their 
implications for issues of leadership, control and representation. Although 
they may emerge without a specific author, action frames do lend them-
selves to contests of authorization. The question then is not merely who 
can enrol most support for a particular definition, but also who 'owns' 
the history of the social movement. These issues of control played a role 
throughout the entire history of the Cordillera movement, but became 
particularly clear when the movement broke into factions in 1986, when 
it entered negotiations with the new national government of Corazón 
Aquino over regional autonomy. This will be the focus of the latter part 
of the chapter. 
My conceptualization of discourse formation as negotiated processes fits 
within a constructivist perspective of social movements. Before discussing 
the issue of discourse formation, let me first give an overview of strands 
of social movement theory that have emerged since the 1960s and elabor-
ate on the constructed character of movements. 
Social Movements: Theoretical Perspectives 
New theories of social movements (and theories of new social move-
ments), began to flourish by the end of the 1960s. The abundant rise of 
social movements in Europe and the United States, most prominently 
among students and blacks, did not seem to fit the restricted place they 
were allotted in prevailing paradigms. Two strands are usually distin-
guished in theories of social movements that evolved in the 1970s. One 
strand, associated with the new social movement theories, sought to 
understand why movements rose in the context of postindustrial societies 
and emphasized their cultural components. The other, referred to as 
resource mobilization theories, focused on the question of how social 
movements came about, and how obstacles to collective action were 
overcome, in particular Olson's 'free-rider' problem. The centre of 
gravity of the new social movement theories was found in Europe, of the 
resource mobilization theories in the United States. 
New Social Movement Theories 
New social movement theories were associated with student and later 
peace, women's and environmental movements in Europe and the US. 
The new social movements were different from their forerunners, particu-
larly the labour movement. These differences were largely a matter of the 
movement's constituency (which was based in new middle classes with 
remarkable participation by women rather, cultural character, loose organ-
izational structure and aversion to traditional party politics, emphasis on 
lifestyle and values instead of material demands, anti-modernistic stance, 
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and their unconventional action forms (Alan Scott 1988, pp. 16-19, 
Klandermans 1988, p. 7). New social movements have mainly been defined 
in the context of Europe and the US, but the concept has also been applied 
in some parts of the southern hemisphere, mainly in Latin America. There, 
social movements, such as urban, women's, indigenous, and peasant 
movements, have been considered to share many of the above-mentioned 
characteristics, with the notable exception that their main constituency is 
found among poor people, not the middle classes, and that their demands 
are partly material (see, for example, Escobar 1992). 
The label of 'newness' attached to recent social movements provoked 
endless debates about whether one could truly speak of new movements 
or whether they shared much in practice with older movements. The other 
side of the argument was that 'old' movements, in their initial stages, 
shared many of the properties of the new ones, until doomed to 
bureaucratize according to Michels' 'iron law of oligarchy.' Melucci, a 
one-time pupil of Touraine and one of the first proponents of the 'novelty 
camp,' pointed out in his later writings that the debate centred on a false 
problem. According to Melucci, both sides in the debate suffered from the 
same flaw, namely perceiving social movements as unitary, empirical 
objects, a point to which I shall return later (Melucci 1988, p. 336). 
The novelty claim, apart from being based on the phenomenological 
characteristics of the movements, found a theoretical base in the 'new 
historical stage' that societies in the North were supposed to have 
entered, namely post-industrialism, regulated primarily by high-tech, 
knowledge-centred processes. The most renowned theorist that situated 
the 'new' social movements in relation to post-industrialism was 
Touraine. This Marxist-bred scholar broke away from structural theories 
by reversing the connection between social structure and social action, and 
promoting a sociology of action rather than of society. The social system, 
he proposed, is created by social action, instead of action being the result 
of some meta-social principle. The goal that Touraine defined for social 
movements is the control of historicity: the set of cultural models a society 
uses to produce its norms in the domains of knowledge, production and 
ethics (Touraine 1984, 1995). This notion made Touraine's social move-
ments both a social conflict and a cultural project: 'its goal is always the 
realization of cultural values as well as the victory over a social adver-
sary' (Touraine 1995, p. 240). 
Despite Touraine's overtly anti-structuralist stance, critics have pointed 
to a certain continuity in his work of exactly those theories he so strongly 
opposed. He abandoned the central contradiction of capitalism as the 
driving force of social action, but seemed to put the central social conflict 
over historicity in its place. He equated social movements with classes, 
albeit classes for themselves and not in themselves, and asserted that 
'there is only one social movement for each class in each type of society' 
(Touraine 1983, cited in Scott 1990, p. 68). As one critic stated, Touraine, 
124 Images and Realities of Rural Life 
and other new social movement theorists of the 1970s, including 
Habermas, 'searched for a substitute for the working class, and a new 
focus of opposition to society in its totality' (Scott 1990, p. 80). 
Resource Mobilization Theories 
The other strand of social movement thinking since the 1970s was formed 
by resource mobilization theories. These originated with Olson, who 
coined the concept of 'free-rider problem' to point out that people tend 
not to commit resources to struggles for collective benefits, since they 
enjoy the fruits of collective action regardless of their individual participa-
tion. Olson's position was extensively criticized for relying on an econ-
omic model of rational decision making at the individual level. It lacked 
explanatory power since although it made non-participation understand-
able, his theory failed to explain why people do so often participate in 
collective action, sometimes at great personal risk. In Olson's line of 
thinking people's needs and goals were treated as given, it ignored the 
social processes through which people's motivation becomes shaped 
(Scott 1990, pp. 109-131). Moreover, the individualistic basis of Olson's 
decision-making model was discredited when others, including Melucci 
and Kreisi, showed the importance of social networks within movements 
as localities for processes of identification and mobilization (Tarrow 1994, 
p. 21). 
Later resource mobilization theories started to address the question that 
remained unsolved by early exponents of this strand, namely in what 
circumstances discontent leads to collective action. Discontent does not 
automatically result in resistance, nor does resistance automatically result 
in collective action, as has been demonstrated by Scott (1985). One of the 
themes of resource mobilization theories, then, became the search for the 
conditions under which collective action actually emerges. The argument 
was advanced that collective action does not come about in response to 
deprivation, but in response to changes in political opportunity structures 
(Tarrow 1994). Another important element in the development of social 
movements was found in the role of 'sympathetic third parties' (Klander-
mans 1988, pp. 4-7). 
Resource mobilization theories thus moved a long way from Olson's 
original thesis and became increasingly finely tuned to the volatile prac-
tices and dilemmas involved in collective action. On the other hand, this 
body of theories was still criticized for over-emphasizing the 'how' of 
social movements, with a penchant for behaviourism, at the expense of 
looking at the content and socio-political context of specific social move-
ments (Klandermans 1988; p. 4, Scott 1990, p. 129). 
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Towards a Constructivist Perspective on Social Movements 
The two strands of new social movements and resource mobilization 
theories, seem to converge in recent literature on social movements. 
Several contributions to the field explicitly aim to combine the strengths 
of both (Klandermans 1988; Scott 1990; Escobar 1992). What makes these 
contributions remarkable, in my view, is not so much the wrapping up of 
debates by synthesizing approaches, but the way that they mark the 
advent of a more constructivist perspective on social movements. All of 
these works evince the constructed character of social movements, to 
varying degrees. Melucci, however, seems the most consistent in thinking 
through the implications of this insight. 
According to Melucci, many of the earlier debates on social movements 
treated collective action as a unitary empirical datum, rather than as 
processes in which actors produce meanings, communicate, negotiate, and 
make decisions. Once the notion of relatively unitary actors is abandoned, 
or taken as a product rather than a given, the question of how a 'collec-
tive' actor is formed and maintains itself becomes a problem of analysis 
(Melucci 1988, p. 331). Rather than synthesizing, Melucci distances himself 
from both new social movement and resource mobilization theories. 
'The explanation founded on the common structural condition of the 
actors takes for granted their capacity to perceive, evaluate and decide 
what they have in common; it ignores, in other words, the very pro-
cesses that enable the actors to define (or prevent them from defining) 
the situation as susceptible of common action. On the other hand, 
individual differences and motivations never suffice to explain how 
certain individuals come to recognize themselves in and become part of 
a more or less integrated 'we'. ' (Melucci 1988, p. 332) 
According to Melucci, actors produce collective action because 'they are 
able to define themselves and to define their relationship with the environ-
ment (other actors, available resources, opportunities and obstacles).' In 
the world of Melucci, then, identity formation is accorded central import-
ance: any theory of action that includes actors' expectations, (relating the 
actors to the external world), implies an underlying theory of identity. 
'For only if an actor can perceive his consistency and his continuity will 
he be able to construct his own script of the social reality and compare 
expectations and realizations' (ibid, p. 340). 
This claim calls into question several issues.2 What, then, is (collective) 
identity? And, this is where I would disagree with Melucci, is a person's 
perception of 'his consistency and continuity' indeed a sine qua non for 
his/her decision to participate in collective action? By introducing this 
condition, does he not re-impose continuity and consistency, via a back-
door, on collective action and social movements? 
126 Images and Realities of Rural Life 
Identity or Identification? 
Identity is considered an important aspect of social movements: through 
processes of identity formation, the 'we' is supposed to get constructed 
that engages in collective action. Identity used to be perceived as an innate 
quality, a stable property possessed by a person. From this position it has 
recently been launched on a soaring career. As Tilly has summarized it, 
concepts of public identities have increasingly become relational, cultural, 
historical, and contingent: 
'The emerging view is relational in the sense that it locates identities 
in connections among individuals and groups, rather than in the minds 
of particular persons or whole populations. It is cultural in insisting that 
social identities rest on shared understandings and their representations. 
It is historical in calling attention to the path dependent accretion of 
memories, understandings and means of action within particular ident-
ities. Finally, it is contingent in that it regards each assertion of identity 
as a strategic interaction liable to failure or misfiring rather than as a 
straightforward expression of an actor's attributes.' (Tilly 1995, p. 5) 
Tndigenousness' is a particular kind of identity. It is a form of ethnic 
identity in which groups define themselves in relation to other groups. 
Differences are not only perceived as cultural, and expressed in fields 
varying from the regulation of interpersonal or intercommunity relations 
to agricultural practices; the indigenous people are also perceived as being 
overpowered by these others and deprived of their original rights to 
resources and governance over a particular area. Since indigenousness is 
linked to a physical area, its emergence is closely related to the formation 
processes of the wider nation in which it is situated. The nation state 
seems not only the natural antagonist of indigenous peoples, but also the 
entity on which indigenous identity is imposingly or oppositionally bred. 
In the case of the Cordillera, Finin has demonstrated that in as much as 
a 'regional identity' (he carefully avoids references to ethnic or indigen-
ous identity) had come about prior to the Chico Dams and related 
struggles, this was the product of the administrative grids imposed by the 
Americans during their colonial rule in the first half of this century. Basing 
his argument on Anderson (1991), he traces the prospects of an 'imagined 
community' emerging in the Cordillera to the protective policies that the 
Americans under Dean Worcester extended to the 'tribes' in an area they 
demarcated as the Cordillera. The Cordillera gained further 'reality' 
through amongst other things, the introduction of segregated workforces 
in the mines, and separate education institutes for Cordillera residents. 
These processes fostered an occasionally expressed experience of difference 
with outside areas among Cordillera residents and, even more unlikely at 
the turn of the century, a sense of commonality within (Finin 1991). This 
perception, embryonic as it may have been at the time, seems partly to 
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account for the particular shape the social movement in the Cordillera took 
when the opposition against the Chico dams started. 
However, although certain seeds of an 'indigenous identity' facilitated 
the particular shape the Cordillera movement took, it cannot account for 
the discourses that emerged, nor for the broad composition of the move-
ment. The discourse of the movement came to centre on the vital value of 
land in indigenous culture. However, as will become clear, this cannot be 
taken as a property of indigenous identity. Everyday practices in the 
Cordillera showed a range of values accorded to land, varying from an 
inalienable, sacred expression of life itself to a commodity that could be 
put up for sale (Prill Brett 1993). The question of how, in the course of the 
struggle, people started to identify with land as synonymous to life then 
emerges as one of the most important to explain, rather than be treated as 
a given. 
Indigenous identity can also not account for the composition of the 
movement. As will be elaborated, the movement attracted many advocates 
who were by no means 'indigenous,' varying from national politicians, 
a range of anti-dictatorship activists, an organization for national liber-
ation, and international advocates. Indeed, like all movements, this was 
not a unitary entity. Rather than artificially separating the constituents of 
the movement from 'third parties,' I think these diverse groups should 
be included as part of the movement. This further calls into question the 
idea of identity towards an issue as a condition for participation in a social 
movement. What the 'advocates' shared was not an indigenous identity, 
but rather a sense of identification with the movement. A great number of 
people started to make the concerns of this movement of 'others' into 
their own, at considerable risk to themselves. 
Following Norman Long (1997), I think, then, it is more appropriate to 
speak of processes of identification with an issue or movement. Identifi-
cation, according to Long, 'allows one to consider a wide range of self 
definitions, some more fixed and continuous, others more fleeting and 
highly situational. How people make and attribute identification to them-
selves and others offers a key for understanding cultural and socio-politi-
cal orientations and commitments.' 
Discourse Formation in Social Movements 
Collective action and social movements partly depend on how people 
define a situation and how they assess their possibilities for action. The 
formation of discourses is therefore a key aspect of social movement 
theories. In new social movement theories that position social movements 
in post-industrial societies, there is basically only room for one guiding 
discourse. If, as Touraine claimed, there is only one social movement for 
each class in each type of society, it follows that there is also only one 
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'correct' discourse of action. In other words, the discourse gets built into 
the definition of social movements. 
Resource mobilization theories, in their search for conditions for collec-
tive action to occur, have done more to problematize the discourses of 
social movements. In these theories the discourses of collective action have 
been labelled 'collective action frames.' In a recent contribution to social 
movement theories, Tarrow deals extensively with the framing processes 
that lead to action frames. As he explains: 
'Out of a toolkit of possible symbols, movement entrepreneurs choose 
those that they hope will mediate among the cultural underpinnings of 
the groups they appeal to, the sources of official culture and the mili-
tants of their movement - and still reflect their own beliefs and aspir-
ations. To relate text to context, grammar to semantics, we need a 
concept more suited to the interactive nature of social movements and 
their societies. A contemporary group of scholars offers such a concept 
in their idea of collective action frames.' (Tarrow 1994, p. 122) 
The concept of framing to which Tarrow refers stems from Snow and 
companions, who contend that movements function in part as signifying 
agents that carry, transmit, mobilize and produce meaning for participants, 
antagonists and observers. Adopting the concept from Goffman, they call 
this 'signifying work framing' (Snow 1988, p. 198). The emerging collec-
tive action frames have a mobilizing appeal and serve to 'dignify and 
justify' the movement (Tarrow 1994, p. 99) 
Notwithstanding the valuable insight that actors' experiences need to 
be linked to prospects for action in order for (collective) action to occur, 
Tarrow's position is highly problematic. In the first place, he presents 
collective action frames as carefully plotted and produced by entrepre-
neurs. By separating the entrepreneurs from the constituency of move-
ments, he seems to deny agency to non-entrepreneurs, and forecloses them 
from an active role in the processes of framing. Although this picture may 
reflect certain moments of certain movements, for example when an 
established movement launches a campaign to expand its constituency, it 
does not capture those moments of a movement when framing is 'every-
body's ' business and concern. 
This brings me to the second objection. Not unlike Touraine, Tarrow's 
presentation implies that each social movement has one discourse, and 
moreover, that this discourse originates before the movement 'takes off.' 
In his model, the entrepreneurs and their objectives are given outside of 
and prior to the collective action. By so doing, he reifies social movements. 
One of the implications is that he misses the contestations that may occur 
in the formation of collective action frames as well as in the power 
struggles that accompany these contestations. 
The problems inherent in Tarrow's approach can be met, I believe, by 
adopting a more constructivist view of what he calls 'framing processes,' 
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and what I refer to as discourse formation. Consistent with a perception 
of social movements as constructed processes, instead of unitary phenom-
ena, I propose to view discourse formation as negotiated. Non-linear, 
multi-polar and not necessarily consistent, they are emergent properties 
that evolve out of the practice of collective action. 
Seen as a negotiated process also allows for inclusion of the role of 
'non-entrepreneurs' in discourse formation. In this respect, I think it 
makes sense to take a look at Scott's concept of hidden transcripts. The 
concept is derived from public transcripts: open interaction between 
subordinates and superiors. 'Hidden transcripts are discourses that take 
place 'off-stage': they consist of those speeches, gestures, and practices 
that confirm, contradict, or inflect what appears in the public transcript' 
(Scott 1990, p. 4). Discussed in private, whispered about in public, hinted 
at through jokes, these are narratives shaped among peers to contextualize 
their situation. Hidden transcripts play a role in what Scott terms infra-
politics: 'the circumspect struggles waged daily by subordinated groups 
that is, like infrared rays, beyond the visible end of the spectrum' (ibid, 
p. 183). Scott's contention is that there is an analogy between infrapolitics 
and the infrastructure that, for example, enables commerce: 'Infrapolitics 
provides much of the cultural and structural underpinning of the more 
visible political action on which our attention has generally been focused.' 
(ibid, p. 184) 
Although Scott's hidden transcripts sometimes appear to be odd 
characters, like ready-made products working in the dark, waiting for the 
right provocation to burst out of their hiding places, his contribution 
appears to be very relevant to the discussion of framing social movements. 
The production of hidden transcripts could, to my mind, be understood 
as processes of discourse formation in people's everyday life. Discourse 
formation as people's everyday occupation should, I believe, complement 
the concept of framing as the craft of the entrepreneur.3 Discourse forma-
tion, then, should be viewed as a negotiating process in which the distinc-
tion between entrepreneurs and constituency are not preordained but get 
constructed in the process. 
The following narrative, on the social movement in the Cordillera, 
exemplifies this perspective on discourse formation. The first part will 
focus on processes of discourse formation in the relation between edu-
cated, political 'entrepreneurs' and villagers, and the second on the 
contests between different groups of 'entrepreneurs' who started to 
compete for leadership of the movement. 
The Chico River Struggle 
The Chico river is the longest and most elaborate river in the Gran 
Cordillera mountain range, flowing through Kalinga and Mountain Prov-
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inces. The first proposals to construct dams in the Chico river stem from 
the 1960s, when the Philippine government started to explore means of 
generating electricity locally in the face of increasing urbanization and 
industrialization. The initial plans, however, were shelved because they 
were not considered feasible in either economic or political terms. This 
situation changed drastically in the early 1970s. World prices for crude oil 
increased sharply and, with the declaration of Martial Law, President 
Marcos concentrated such considerable power under his authority that 
firm implementation of the project could be expected. A German contract 
firm conducted a Worldbank financed pre-feasibility study in 1973, and 
came up with a proposal to build four dams in the Chico river, simply 
named Chico I, II, III and IV. According to the study, the best way to 
proceed was to start with Chico II in Sadanga, Mountain Province. Follow-
ing the study, the National Power Corporation (NPC), was charged with 
continuing survey work. The actual construction of Chico II was scheduled 
to start in 1978, and to be completed in 1982 (Carino 1980, p. 3). 
The people along the Chico only became aware of the plans when 
survey teams entered their areas. It did not take long for them to recognize 
the threat to their communities embodied in the projects, and the survey 
team's first two camps in Basao were soon torn down by the villagers. In 
a third effort to erect a surveyors' camp, the NPC personnel was backed 
up by a military escort. The escorting unit of the Philippine Constabulary 
began by intimidating the villagers, which involved amongst other things 
to force local boys to join a William Tell game, and shooting coconuts off 
their heads (Anti-Slavery Society 1983, p. 103). 
The villagers, alarmed by the behaviour of the Constabulary and the 
material damage done by surveyors to crops and fruit trees, began to seek 
the intervention of the President. They brought six petitions to the Presi-
dent in the course of 1974, hoping that President Marcos would withdraw 
the project once he realized its impact on local residents. Each petition, the 
costs of which were born by the community and church support, was 
taken by a delegation of village elders to the Presidential Palace, but none 
of them got the chance of actually meeting Marcos. A letter by the Presi-
dent in response to the first delegation labelled their arguments as 'senti-
mental' and called upon them to 'sacrifice themselves for the sake of the 
nation' (ibid). 
Until this time, opposition to the dams had been localized. Local, 
village-based resistance to intrusions, such as in this case the dams, were 
a typical response in the region's history. The Cordillera had been little 
integrated in the country's colonial history with Spain, and stands there-
fore to a certain extent apart from the lowlands. Being apart from the 
lowlands did not, of course, automatically mean that it formed a region in 
any political, cultural or social sense. No less than seven mutually unintel-
ligible languages were spoken in the 'region.' Until the turn of this 
century, the principal level of social and political organization was concen-
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trated in villages, although there were larger constellations loosely referred 
to as 'tribes.' For outside observers, Cordillerans were all tied up in 
traditional institutions and practices, which earned them the common label 
of 'Igorots.' Seen from within, however, cultural diversity and inter-
village competition were major characteristics of this 'region.' Only in 
the twentieth century, under American colonial rule, did the contours of 
a region apart from but integrated into the Philippine nation start to take 
shape. Notwithstanding a certain degree of regionalization brought about 
by the Americans, the Cordillera in the early 1970s remained predominant-
ly an area of 'village societies' (see Prill Brett 1989). In Bontok and 
Kalinga, competition seems to have been the main element in everyday 
village relations, regularly developing into intervillage warfare. Although 
some mechanisms had been created to regulate this competition, to which 
I shall return later, these same mechanisms underlined the division 
between the ilis (villages). 
It is therefore not surprising that the villages affected by the dam did 
not initially coordinate or unite much beyond village level. One of the 
early petitions to the President, for example, actually expressed support for 
the dam, as long as it would be built in the area of another village (Berg 
1996, p. 50). Later petitions were signed by more villages, and took a 
completely oppositionist stand against the dams. With the enrolment of 
church people, the struggle started to appeal to outsiders. 
Contours of a Movement 
In April 1975, the Catholic Bishop Francisco Claver, of Bontok origin, 
aligned himself with the Chico basin residents in an open letter to the 
President. I shall quote at length from this letter, since it draws on several 
themes that came to be central in the opposition to the dam: 
'Mr. President, 
I came here because I was summoned by my people. . . . They do not 
accept your decree - if decree it is. They will not accept it. This is the 
message they want me to convey to you, with respect, yes, but with 
firmness, too. Deep down in their guts they know damming the Chico 
is a decree of death for them as a people. This they cannot, will not accept. 
. . . My people are giving serious thought to armed violence and they 
are asking whom they should approach for arms. Mr. President, when 
a Bontok has to turn to a people not his own for help, this only means 
he has tried his supreme best to solve his problem by himself, and he 
realizes his powerlessness in the face of overwhelming odds. In short, 
he is desperate. Armed violence is the only answer, and he knows his spear 
and head-axe are no match for your guns . . . It is my prayer that their 
message will get through to you and you will grant them the least of 
their requests: a hearing, a real hearing at some future date. This is all 
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they ask - for the moment.' (cited in Anti-Slavery Society 1983, p. 104, 
emphasis added) 
The Bishop's phrase that the dams meant the death of a people, expresses 
the vital symbolic meaning of land. Land, as a central element in the 
ancestral worship of people in the Chico Valley, became a focal point in 
oppositionist discourse. As one of the later advocate papers explained: 
'All the many ancestor and spirit gods are associated, in the people's 
minds, with the land of the home region. The remains of all who die, 
even those who may die many miles away, are brought home. The 
home region - the land and all its improvements [a reference to the rice 
terraces constructed in the area over centuries, D.H.] - as it appears 
today, is largely the accumulation of the collective efforts of deceased 
ancestors, of generations of cooperation between the spirits and the 
living. The living are the guardians of this inheritance and, therefore, 
have the strong responsibility for the care of the land and the dead. The 
ancestral spirits will hold the living accountable for any neglect in this 
awesome responsibility.' (Carino 1980, p. 5) 
The Tand is life' theme was to become the most pronounced in the 
course of the struggle. This does not mean that it had been from the start, 
or that it was equally shared by everybody. Around 1977, for example, 
twenty families from the village of Tanglag accepted the government's 
offer to relocate. They came back, however, after some months, because 
the government had not delivered what it promised (Berg 1996, p. 58). 
The other implicit element in Bishop Claver's letter was the threat of 
violent resistance. By mentioning the spear and the head-axe he evoked 
the formally eradicated head-hunting days that continued to linger - if not 
in practice, certainly in the local memory and in lowland conceptions of 
Cordillerans. While the image of fierce head-hunting warriors exacting 
retribution for the desecration of their lands hovers over the letter, their 
capacity and preparedness to play according to the rules of the game of 
'modern,' lowland politics is clear in the conventional and non-violent 
demand for a hearing with the President. The threat of violence remains, 
while at the same time the Bishop makes it clear that these are not a 
'horde of savages' ready to attack Malacanang, but 'reasonable people' 
to be taken seriously in the negotiations concerning the dams. This two-
faced representation is typical for the repertoire of contention (Tarrow 
1994, p. 19, based on Tilly) that was to emerge during the struggle: 
founded in traditional elements of warfare, but following 'modern' 
tactics to confront the national government. 
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The Multi-Lateral Peace Pact 
The increasingly integrated opposition movement, consisting of multiple 
villages in the area as well as 'outsiders,' became institutionalized in 
1975 through the creation of a multi-lateral peace pact. This instrument 
was developed during a church sponsored conference in Manila that 
brought 150 village people from the Chico valley to the capital. 
The peace pact, called Vochong or Bodong among the Kalingas and 
Pechen among the Bontoks is a traditional institution regulating relations 
between two villages. Although there are many variations, essential 
elements of such peace pacts are that each village assures the safety of 
residents of the other village when they come within its boundaries, and 
that the peace pact holders take responsibility for violence or crimes 
committed by one of their people against somebody from the other village. 
One of the implications of village responsibility is that violence can be 
avenged against any person from the other village (see Benedito 1994; 
Dozier 1966, pp. 197-239; Barton 1949, pp. 167-208). 
The peace pact made at the conference differed in two respects from 
these traditional ones. First, the signatories of the pact consisted of a great 
number of parties, not just two villages, and included outsiders who 
extended their solidarity to the struggle. Second, the content of the pact 
accommodated the needs of the particular struggle at hand, and aimed to 
unite villages against the government. The pact stipulated, for example, 
sanctions against anyone who cooperated with the National Power Corpor-
ation. In order to avoid conflicts between villages, two sections of the Pagta 
ti Bodong were included to place struggle related violence outside the 
jurisdiction of the existing peace pacts among villages: 
'2. Should a Kalinga or Bon tok from the dam areas be killed while 
working on the dam project, the peace pact villages opposed to the dam 
will not be held responsible, nor will they have to answer for the 
victim. 
6. A peace pact already existing between two barrios will not be affected 
in any way when one of the members of a peace pact village dies or is 
killed as a consequence of his working with the NPC. Relatives will 
claim his body quietly but are prohibited from taking revenge.' (cited 
in Anti-Slavery Society 1983, p. 105) 
These sections thus made exceptions to the practice of village responsibil-
ity for violence committed in their area. The conference peace pact, then, 
laid down and regulated the intervillage character that had developed in 
the oppositionist struggle. I will later elaborate on how this peace pact, 
both in its conceptualization and in its enforcement partly depended on 
the intervention of the New People's Army. 
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Government Strategies: Divide and Rule 
Several weeks after the conference, Marcos abruptly ordered the NPC to 
cease all operations and to withdraw from the area. No explanation was 
offered, but it was believed that his government, in the light of the Muslim 
war in the South of the country, wanted to avoid a second front of open 
rebellion in the North (Anti-Slavery Society 1983, p. 106). 
The relief at the suspension of the operation was, however, short-lived. 
By October 1975 it became clear that the government wanted to pursue the 
activity, and that the project had started work on another site, in 
Tomiangan, Kalinga, where Chico IV was planned. Tomiangan is a settle-
ment of twenty-six households along the shore of the river. Chico IV 
would submerge six other barrios, with a total number of 670 to 1,000 
families, according to different estimations (Carino 1980, p. 4). The national 
government apparently believed that it could divert the opposition, by 
choosing another site. This turned out to be a miscalculation. Those 
villages in Mountain province that were no longer directly affected by the 
project continued their involvement with the opposition in cooperation 
with the Kalinga villages. 
In order to break the opposition, and in particular the intervillage 
cooperation, the government now brought the Presidential Assistant on 
National Minorities (PANAMIN) onto the scene. The head of PANAMIN 
was Manuel Elizalde, a scion of one of the richest families of the 
Philippines. Elizalde arrived in Kalinga in November 1975, accompanied 
by a convoy of four freight trucks, three buses, a helicopter and eight other 
vehicles. His entourage of sixty people included fully armed soldiers, 
doctors, lawyers, cinema operators, 'hospitality girls,' and two magicians 
(Rocamora 1979). 
Apart from trying to impress people by handing out money, rice, and 
other items, PANAMIN's policies to 'pacify' the Kalingas were based 
on divide and rule tactics. This included the intensification of a local 
conflict by supplying arms to a village at 'war' with two of the 
oppositionist villages. Through a combination of tricks, bribery, and 
promises for development projects, Elizalde was able to enrol a number 
of community leaders to support the dam project (Winnacker 1979). In his 
own way, Elizalde thus also built his strategies on cultural heritage and 
practices in the area, namely intervillage competition and feuds that until 
recently had dominated relations between villages. While the opposition 
maximized the regulating mechanism of the peace pact, he tried to exploit 
the underlying competition between villages. 
Despite, or perhaps because of, the rather crude interference of 
PANAMIN, local resistance against the NPC continued. The villagers in 
Kalinga responded in similar ways to the people in Bontok: by physically 
obstructing the surveying work and by petitioning the President. While 
villagers tried to stop the NPC from constructing buildings, the govern-
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ment responded with increasing military intervention. During one of the 
villagers' raids on the camps, around one hundred villagers, mainly 
women, were detained and taken to an unknown military camp. The 
search for detainees took several months, during which villagers' net-
works in Manila vastly expanded. They enroled the assistance of several 
NGOs and senators, amongst others. 
The struggle got an impetus at the local level when some people from 
the New People's Army, of the underground Communist Party of the 
Philippines, arrived and offered to assist villagers in fighting the dams. 
The villagers readily accepted the offer. As one of them explained during 
my fieldwork: 
'We had a strong opposition. First, we took a clear position to stop the 
dams. So, we don't allow any materials or constructions into the area. 
Later, we were outnumbered by the military, so we wrote petitions. But 
the president of the organization who went to Malacanang was tempted 
by Elizalde's offer and changed position. A next president was also 
bribed, so we began to get frustrated. Then the NPA came. We didn't 
know what to do any more by ourselves, so we thought maybe the 
armed group could help us further.' (fieldnotes, February, 1996) 
Entry of the New People's Army 
The New People's Army was established in 1969 as the armed branch of 
the Communist Party of the Philippines which had been formed one year 
earlier. After the imposition of Martial Law, when many legal opposition 
groups were forced underground, the CPP/NPA expanded to become the 
National Democratic Front with a total of twelve organizations. Following 
the Chinese example, they envisaged a revolution that was waged from 
the countryside. From the outset, the Cordillera provinces were considered 
very suitable for expansion, because of the strategic advantages of a 
mountainous area. As early as 1971, a first NPA group was established in 
Ifugao and in 1972 a Montanosa Party Branch was formed. (Castro 1987, 
p. 27) 
Although these first NPAs did not get involved with the Chico struggle, 
their experiences shed light on later developments in the organization and 
will thus be considered briefly. The NPA leadership in the Cordillera 
consisted of cadres originating from the region, but educated in Manila. 
They were primarily involved as activists in the nationalist movement. 
During the 1970s, however, they became increasingly influenced by a 
revival of interest in indigenous culture and values, which was partly 
triggered by a publication by the historian William Scott, who represented 
the history of the Cordillera as one of a string of episodes of united 
resistance against outside forces (Scott 1993,1972, see also Finin 1991). His 
rather romantic representation of the cultural heritage of the area4 pro-
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vided activists with a historic foundation for emerging Cordilleran dis-
courses of a united 'we.' 
Interest in Cordillera culture on the part of the NPA cadres was further 
increased through everyday experiences in the villages they organized. 
Their (renewed) exposure to Cordillera life led them to initiate debates 
within the Communist Party on how the local situation should be viewed, 
and what approach would be appropriate for the CPP/NPA in the area. 
According to a 1974 assessment, the cadres experienced a 'people's 
generally cold attitude towards the NPA,' and found that Ifugao could 
not identify with the NPA and 'did not see themselves as part of the 
larger Filipino nation' (Castro 1987, p. 27). Moreover, the NPA found 
specific conditions in the area that made it difficult to apply the general 
guidelines laid down in the Philippine Society and Revolution (Guerrero 
1979/1970). According to this handbook, national minorities' right to self 
determination had to be recognized, but 'the correct policy toward all the 
national minorities is to take a proletarian standpoint and make the 
necessary class analysis' (ibid, p. 274). The NPA had tried to follow this 
approach, but after some time came to believe that it was not suitable for 
the Cordillera. They made a proposal to the Central Committee to change 
the Party's style of work in the Cordillera and to form a separate army 
named the Igorot Liberation Army (ILA). This proposal was turned down 
by the central leadership of the Party. The controversy led to a temporary 
suspension of village based work in Ifugao, until 1976 (Castro 1987). 
In the meantime, an NPA unit from Isabela Province had to retreat 
under military pressure to the neighbouring province of Kalinga and took 
the initiative to start organizing there. They stayed in the area for some 
time and gained acceptance there, especially after their leader, Ka Sungar, 
married a Kalinga woman. As opposition to the dams grew, the unit of 
seven NPA cadre decided to move to Tinglayan and offer their help (Finin 
1991, p. 435). The NPA gained much popularity when they started to 
ambush the Battalions based in the Chico area. Yet, the initial numerical 
involvement of the NPA remained modest. The NPA cadre in Kalinga had 
grown to thirty-three by 1979, but then more and more local men, and 
women, started to join (ibid, p. 453). This often took the form of village 
delegations, with all villages of the Chico line sending representations to 
join the NPA. 
NPA involvement coincided with an increasing military presence in the 
area. Faced with growing opposition to the dam the government withdrew 
PANAMIN, which had hardly been successful in 'pacifying' the 
Kalingas, and started to send in more military troops. In the years that 
followed, the NPA took responsibility for armed aspects of the struggle, 
although strongly supported by the population. The NPA, who sat down 
with the villagers as equals and whose lifestyle and discipline generally 
formed a strong positive contrast to the behaviour of government troops, 
remained very popular. Apart from the many Kalingas who actually joined 
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the NPA, most villagers were involved in one way or another, as messen-
gers and by providing food for the NPA cadres. 
With intensifying military operations in the area and the involvement 
of the NPA, the anti-dam opposition set into a kind of rhythm. Villagers' 
everyday routines got framed on the one hand by harsh policies from the 
military side, including for example curfews that placed strong restrictions 
on people attending to their agricultural work; and on the other hand, by 
the need to provide daily food for the cadres. This routine was dotted by 
regular military operations, ambushes, dialogues and other legal forms of 
struggle. The estimated death toll related to the struggle was one hundred 
by 1980, with the majority on the side of government troops, collaborators, 
and NPC personnel (Carino 1980, p. 14). 
The CPP/NPA's Role in Formation of the Oppositionist Discourse 
Although the regional struggle attracted the support of many regional, 
national and international institutions and support networks, I will focus 
on the role of the CPP/NPA. Their role was, I believe, crucial among the 
'outsiders' for several reasons. The CPP/NPA was directly involved in 
the struggle at the local level. Apart from the military support that the 
NPA provided the opposition, they devoted much of their time to educa-
tive work. The educative work concentrated on links between the local 
struggle and the national situation. 
The NPA was also strongly involved in the organization of the move-
ment. They assisted with the formation of local organizations and in 
planning the tactics to be employed in the legal areas. The idea, for 
example, of making a multilateral peace pact originated from NPA cadres. 
Another important element was that the NPA could enforce the inter-
village cooperation laid down in this peace pact. Military informers were 
liquidated by the NPA, and the NPA cadres intervened in village conflicts 
that threatened to disrupt the unity of the opposition. 
The other important ally to the villagers were the churches. The 
churches provided much institutional support and their respectability 
enabled the enrolment of wide support networks among groups with 
different political orientations (Berg 1996). However, inasmuch as the 
churches gave direction to the opposition, this was usually congruent with 
the national democratic politics of the CPP/NPA. The churches did not of 
course officially condone the national democratic movement, but many of 
its members and staff did. One of the largest groups within the National 
Democratic Front was formed by the Christians for National Liberation. 
Church people were thus not just influenced by the national democratic 
movement, but to a large extent formed this movement. Hence, although 
the influence of the churches was substantial, it largely coincided with the 
political direction of the CPP/NPA during these years. The same went for 
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many of the regional and national organizations that supported the oppo-
sition, and those that were later formed as part of the regional movement. 
Local oppositionist discourse gradually changed under the influence of 
the national democratic politics that were propounded by the NPA and 
other organizations. This discourse remained close to the issue of the 
dams, but became increasingly outspoken with themes that pointed to a 
'broader analysis.' 
Window on the Emerging Discourse of the Movement 
In 1980, a group of Kalinga village leaders had a dialogue with the Presi-
dent of the National Power Corporation (NPC), Itchon. The meeting, 
transcribed by observers from the Montanosa Social Action Center 
(MSAC), provides a window on emerging opposition discourse. By this 
time, early themes had become more elaborated and explicit, while new 
themes lifted the struggle beyond the immediate environment of the 
villages. The following excerpts are partly transcribed and partly summar-
ized from the MASC transcription (appendixed to Carino, 1980.) 
The meeting took place in an open space in Binga, Benguet, in the 
presence of Itchon and six other NPC officials. Immediately after the 
opening, Itchon invited the Kalingas to speak, and the first to approach the 
microphone was Macliïng Dulag, the most renowned leader of the opposi-
tion. He said: 
'I have only one thing to state here: your project proposal of building 
dams along our rivers will mean the destruction of all our properties on 
which our very life depends. We Kalingas were once known for our 
well-kept place, but your dam project has brought only trouble among 
us. We, therefore, ask you: forget your dams, we don't want them.' 
A second village elder, Balucnit, added: 
'I have travelled through the lowlands and noted that people there 
could perhaps own pieces of land from two to five hectares. But they 
can get hungry, as they depend only on the production of rice from 
these few hectares. This is not so with us in Kalinga. We don't go 
hungry. We have whole mountain sides for other crops besides our rice 
. . . The electricity that you produce here . . . where does it go but to 
factories and the houses of the wealthy?' 
The statements of Macliïng Dulag and Balucnit reiterated the 'land is 
life' theme, and the implication of death resulting from the dams. By this 
time, however, the argument was couched in a comparative way. The 
Kalinga 'way of life' was compared, favourably, to that of the lowlands. 
If development meant following the path of the lowlands, they were not 
interested in it. In questioning the purpose of the dams, for (predominant-
ly foreign-owned) factories and the houses of the wealthy, their denounce-
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ment had become partly incorporated into nationalist and class-based 
arguments. 
After another seven statements by Kalingas, Itchon explained, in a 
mixture of Ilokano and Tagalog, why they had to pursue with the dams, 
pointing to the energy crisis that threatened the nation. He ended his 
speech by saying: 'I hope you can understand the answer to your ques-
tion: we have no choice but to go ahead with it.' The first Kalinga to 
reply to Itchon brought up another theme that had emerged, namely that 
of discrimination against indigenous peoples: " . . . If you decide in favour 
of dam construction, are we not in this way being considered non-
Filipinos? Or are we third class?' 
In the discussion that followed, Itchon challenged the Kalingas' repre-
sentation of the value they attach to their lifestyle and land. He argued 
that because of a growing population, their way of life was jeopardized 
anyway: 'This was your problem too, long before the NPC went there.' 
Furthermore, he referred to the many Kalingas who already left the area 
to make a living elsewhere and added: 
'God gave us brains, not just hands. And so it is not true that when 
you move out of your places to go elsewhere, you will die there. We 
use our brains to work out our way to live.' 
To this a Kalinga responded: 'God gave us our brains in Kalinga. God 
gave you yours in Manila. Keep to yours!' In no clearer way could he 
have indicated that by now an 'ethnic identity' had come about among 
local participants in the struggle. Lowlanders (in particular Manila people) 
are here presented as not just different species of God's creation (the 
notio'n of God remains as the only shared understanding), but completely 
incongruous to Kalingas. Anticipating the next section of this chapter, it 
is perhaps equally interesting to note that the categories being compared 
are lowlanders versus Kalingas, non-lowlanders versus 'Cordillerans.' 
Macclii'ng added to their defence: 
'While it is true, as you said, that people who have moved to other 
places may have been able to survive, such people voluntarily left their 
original barrios in search of land. But for any of us to be moved forcibly 
away from our homegrounds . . . this is quite a different matter.' 
Macclii'ng here explains the prominence of the 'land is life' theme in the 
struggle. He acknowledges that out-migration and/or selling of land, is an 
accepted and often adhered to part of Kalinga practices. However, he 
points out the crucial difference between voluntarily leaving with the 
option of coming back or at least being buried in the 'homegrounds,' 
and being forced to leave and completely losing the 'homegrounds' to 
inundation. In discussing peasant resistance in Peru, Smith described a 
similar process. He showed how in times of conflict, peasants were able 
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to pose a common front without, however, forgetting their heterogeneity. 
In the course of the conflict, 
'heightened discourse engaged people intensely in the 'production of 
culture' and in so far as membership and meaning were not just 
abstract notions vaguely linked to identity but rather were essential to 
the continuation of livelihood, participants were intensely committed to 
the outcome of this debate.' (Smith 1989, p. 26) 
In the case of Kalinga, the sacred value of land was part of local concepts 
prior to the struggle, albeit amongst more varied practices and values in 
relation to land. However, once faced with the threat of completely losing 
the land, the equation of land to life and something worth dying for 
became the dominant public transcript of villagers. 
Two-Way Influences: Debates Within the Vanguard 
Although the influence of the CPP/NPA on the development of opposition 
discourse and the organization of the movement was substantial, it should 
not be overestimated in relation to the role of the village elders and the 
local people. In organizing the movement, the NPA built on existing 
village networks and practices and, as the discussion above demonstrates, 
village leaders left an unmistakable imprint on processes of framing. 
Besides, with the expansion of the NPA, it became an increasingly local 
force. The vast majority of NPA cadres came from the region, and 'civil-
ian' villagers took a lion's share of the risks and responsibilities to 
maintain the struggle. 
Moreover, the ideological influence worked both ways. The experiences 
of NPA cadres in Kalinga also led to debates within the Communist Party. 
As in the preceding years in Ifugao, the CPP/NPA leaders deployed in the 
region began to review the relation of the struggle in the Cordillera with 
the national revolution. In 1979, the NPA chapter in Kalinga made a 
proposal for the establishment of an Anti-Dam Democratic Alliance 
(ADDA, meaning 'there is') which would comprise a broad coalition of 
anti-dam activists, with the NPA as its army. The perceptions underlying 
the proposal were more or less similar to those of the ILA proposal that 
had come earlier from Ifugao NPAs. The proponents of ADDA thought the 
issue of the dam was a more important key-link than feudalism and 
wanted to incorporate indigenous concepts in organizing work. (Castro 
1987, p. 29) 
History was, however, repeated when the Regional Secretariat of the 
CPP, turned the proposal down. The Secretariat was concerned that the 
proposed changes would eventually lead to a replacement of the Party by 
ADDA. Moreover, it considered the proposal ideologically flawed. Accord-
ing to the Secretariat, the issue of the dam was in fact a manifestation of 
feudalism, albeit with the government as landlord (ibid). This ideological 
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discussion was far from semantic or academic, and was considered to have 
far reaching implications. If the dams controversy was a regional issue, the 
movement would be primarily in the interest of a national minority. 
Logically, then, there would be no need for leadership beyond the regional 
level. If, on the other hand, the dams were an expression of feudalism, the 
class basis would be of primary importance, subsuming the minority 
question. This would legitimize the integration of the regional opposition 
into a nationwide and centrally coordinated resistance movement. 
Although ADDA did not push through, debates within the NPA continued 
to simmer beneath the surface until eventually, in 1986, one group would 
break away from the CPP/NPA to form its own regional movement. 
Clearly, then, discursive influences during the struggle were two-way 
processes. The CPP/NPA strongly influenced local opposition discourse, 
but at the same time got engrossed in debates concerning their own 
'project' through the experience in the region. The key to understanding 
this two-way process is the changing conceptions of NPA leaders. 
Although deployed in the region as agents of the national Communist 
Party, many of them were personally attached to the region, either through 
birth or, in the case of Ka Sungar, through marriage. Their attachment 
increased through their exposure to the villages and, before long, they 
changed from 'outsiders' to 'brokers,' whose identification with the 
national revolution was in competition with their equally strong identifica-
tion with the region. 
Although seeds of conflict were soon to erupt, it seems that the double 
identification of the CPP/NPA leaders for some time contributed to the 
coherence that characterized the protest movement until 1986. Visitors and 
observers during these days were impressed, according to many enthusi-
astic testimonies in the press, by a movement which was carried both by 
educated, Manila-bred participants as well as the local population; a close 
cooperation between above ground and underground structures and, 
above all, a movement full of vibrancy. 
Movement for Regional Autonomy 
The protest movement grew significantly all over the Cordillera in the 
period from 1980 to 1986. Apart from the Chico Dams controversy, another 
hotbed of resistance had emerged in the Province of Abra, against a 
government sponsored wood company. From the two centres of resistance, 
the movement spread to other places, increasingly acquiring a regional 
character. During these years, the regional movement also expanded vastly 
through legal organizations, both at local and regional levels. In 1984, the 
Cordillera People's Alliance (CPA) was formed. An initial membership 
of twenty-five organizations doubled within a year. The CPA embodied 
the village organizations, as well as NGOs and other support groups such 
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as human rights, media, and anti-dictatorship groups, which had been 
formed. 
The CPA was dedicated to greater Cordillera unity and self-determina-
tion. One of the CPA activities was to coordinate the growing international 
support networks which the regional struggles had attracted. Lobby work 
by international advocates, amongst others, led the Worldbank to suspend 
its financial support for the Chico river dams, which all but meant the end 
of the project. Some time later, under the Aquino administration, the 
project was officially cancelled. Another effect of international work was 
that it enlarged the exposure of Cordillera activists to international dis-
courses on indigenous rights, as developed, among other places, at 
indigenous people's gatherings of the United Nations. The international 
links served to strengthen the regional movement's emphasis on its 
'difference' from the lowlands. The oppositionist agenda in the region 
became increasingly formulated in terms of indigenous people's rights. 
The formation of CPA announced the change that had taken place of a 
movement against particular government interventions towards a move-
ment for regional autonomy. The movement had changed from 'protest 
to proposal' (Fais Borda 1992, p. 305). Moreover, through the experience 
of struggle at local level, exacerbated by international developments, the 
'proposal' concerned the region and focused on indigenous rights, rather 
than the nation state. This transformation meant that the movement's 
activities became more centred in Baguio City and were more dominated 
by educated people. 
Political opportunities opened up in 1986 to enter negotiations with the 
national government. When Corazón Aquino replaced Marcos, a new 
Constitution was formulated and CPA successfully lobbied for a provision 
on regional autonomy. A tedious negotiation process developed in the 
years that followed. The stakes in the process were the authorities man-
dated to the regional level. In the process it became clear that the national 
government was trying to maintain as much control as possible over the 
region's natural resources and military and financial matters. As it turned 
out, the proposal for an autonomous region resulting from the negotiations 
vested little power at the regional level more resembling an administrative 
than an autonomous region. Moreover, autonomy was not realized because 
the proposal was turned down in a plebiscite, which led to an as yet 
unresolved impasse in the process towards autonomy. 
One of the reasons why the autonomous region was not realized, is that 
the autonomy movement had lost its external coherence. Three factions 
emerged within the movement during the negotiation process, the result-
ing groups devoted much of their energy to struggling with each other in 
the autonomy negotiation arena. Fierce competition arose over matters of 
representation in the negotiations, and the role that different factions 
would have in the public organs to be created in the autonomous region. 
A complicated game evolved in which each group tried to gain the upper 
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hand in the negotiations. The different parties employed a range of tactics, 
including lobbying government representatives, withdrawing from panels 
believed to be dominated by others, criticizing negotiations in which they 
were not included as undemocratic, and so on. Each faction's tactics 
reflected on the one hand their assessment of the intentions and policies 
of the national government, and on the other their own estimated strength 
vis-à-vis the competing groups. 
Leaving aside the further dynamics of this process, I want to discuss 
briefly the factions that emerged in the regional movement during the 
negotiations. With the emergence of different factions, debates concerning 
the movement's discourses intensified. 
Factions Within the Movement for Autonomy 
One group remained the faction aligned to the national democratic move-
ment: the underground CPP/NPA, and the legal CPA. In their analysis, 
the struggle for autonomy could ' only be successfully waged in conjunc-
tion with the overall Filipino struggle for national freedom and democ-
racy' (CPA 1989). The CPA's bid for representation of the Cordillera 
people was based on its formal membership of people's organizations. In 
1987, they claimed to have 124 member organizations, representing an 
estimated 25,000 individuals (Carino 1987, p. 169). The CPP/NPA, 
although never formally involved in the negotiations for autonomy, 
nonetheless maintained a presence in the process by, amongst others, 
releasing statements through the press. They claimed their status on the 
basis of their involvement in the regional struggles: 
'The people themselves will tell you that they could not have organ-
ized massive and sustained resistance against the Chico River Dam 
project,- the Cellophil Resources Corporation, logging and mining 
concessions, land grabbing, graft and corruption and militarization if 
not for the Communist Party's painstaking and unremitting efforts to 
foster unity among the various tribes and lead the struggle against the 
common enemy' ('Ka Benjie,' in an interview with Malaya, May 1986, 
cited in Finin 1991, p. 571) 
A second faction emerged when, in 1986, an NPA group headed by a 
rebel-priest, Conrado Balweg, bolted and formed its own 'Cordillera 
People's Liberation Army' (CPLA). The CPLA was a result of ongoing 
debates within the regional CPP/NPA. The major grievance of the CPLA, 
according to press releases, was the 'Party's failure to understand and 
accommodate the differences between the Cordillera and lowland society.' 
The CPLA envisaged an autonomous region, governed through extended 
traditional peace pact structures. Their claim to represent the Cordillera 
people was based on their grounding in the regional culture. 
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'We call [the CPLA] the legitimate army of the Cordillera based on its 
history. And if we recall, the NPA only entered the Cordillera . . . 
(when was that?) . . . that was 1970, no? 1972. And the CPLA, although 
it is not yet called CPLA at that time, it is already there. When I say the 
CPLA is already established, I say it in the fact that during our, even 
before the Spanish came to the Philippines our tribal warriors, or I 
mean clan, are already there. Although it is not yet throughout the 
whole Cordillera . . . So, the history of the CPLA begins with the devel-
opments also of this tribal society . . .' (Mailed Molina, during a Press 
conference in March, 1986, cited in Finin 1991, p. 778) 
The national democratic camp and the CPLA soon became each other's 
arch enemies, with their competition even extending to ambushes against 
each other's leaders. Both factions maintained an underground, armed 
component. An increasing number of advocates for regional autonomy 
could not, however, identify with the 'infights,' or distanced themselves 
from armed struggle altogether which they deemed unnecessary after 
democracy was formally restored under Aquino. These people came to 
form a third faction when they organized the Cordillera Broad Coalition 
(CBC). Many of its members were professionals, or local government 
officials in the Cordillera' (Rood 1987, p. x), and its core was associated 
with one of the earlier indigenous lobby organizations in the region 
(Casambre 1991, p. 61; Finin 1991, pp. 260-8). 
The CBC, more than other groups, emphasized the diversity of the 
region, which they represented as 'unity in plurality.' By their own 
claim, they wanted to represent the voice of the 'silent majority,' and 
thus placed a strong emphasis on democratic procedures: 
'There are varied and equally legitimate voices of the Cordilleras. 
These voices speak a 'host of tongues' and articulate a greater range 
of issues and concerns. In any 'peace talks' for the Cordilleras, the 
silent majority cannot and should not be ignored. This is the challenge 
to and of the Cordillera Broad Coalition.' (From CBC statement pres-
ented in Rood 1987, p. 163) 
The three factions that emerged thus all had a different action discourse, 
with varying assessments of the regional situation and correspondingly 
diverging proposals for collective action. However, these were not merely 
competing analyses. Underlying the struggles over the proper way of 
handling the situation were struggles over representation, leadership and 
control of the movement. This becomes particularly clear from those 
elements in the discourses that deal with the history of the struggle. Once 
the conflicts had erupted, each of the factions reconstructed a past that 
gave them particular credit for the struggle and the people's 'victory' 
against the dams. The National Democrats maintained that their contribu-
tion to the struggle lent them the status of representing the people, and the 
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CPLA wanted to derive its status from its cultural embeddedness. The 
CBC, on the other hand, challenged the singular representation of both 
other groups, by maintaining that a plurality of voices should be heard 
and credited, a plurality that they moreover claimed to represent. The 
struggle for control over the movement was thus not limited to competing 
discourses about the action at hand, but also focused on a question of 
'who owns the history of the struggle?' 
Before concluding the chapter, let me return to the question of the 
relation between movement 'entrepreneurs' and villagers in processes of 
discourse formation during the years of autonomy negotiations. Although 
villagers remained involved, the influence of the educated leaders with a 
base in the city increased. A gap clearly emerged between discourses 
formed within organizations at the regional level, and villagers. This was 
particularly clear for the CPA and the CPLA, since these two groups had 
an outspoken vision of the region, and both maintained a popular base in 
the villages to whom they were one way or another accountable. 
The Missing Link: From Local to Regional Identification 
Despite their differences, the CPA and the CPLA had several themes in 
common. Above all, they both condoned the idea of the Cordillera as an 
appropriate unit for an autonomous region. Both the CPLA and the CPA 
formulated a vision to bring the diversity in the Cordillera under one 
regional denominator. Both encountered objections from their popular base 
organizations in the provinces of the Cordillera. 
The CPLA based its regional vision on the institution of the bodong. It 
wanted to transform the bodong into an extralocal and even regional 
institution. The bodong was not, however, practised all over the Cordillera. 
Moreover, in those areas where peace pacts were part of the local institu-
tions, they operated under different names. Bodong only referred to peace 
pacts in the Kalinga vernacular. The proposed promotion of the bodong to 
a central regional institution provoked a fear among people outside bodong 
areas, that CPLA proposals meant that the Kalingas would 'take over' 
the region (PIA 1989; Rood 1994, p. 11, see also Prill Brett 1989). 
The CPA, on the other hand, introduced the concept of Kaigorotan. 
Kaigorotan was represented as a kind of tribe encompassing all 'tribes' 
in the Cordillera. It was CPA's proposed expression of the Cordillera 
people as one population with a common identity. However, the CPA had 
to abandon the concept when they found during their congresses that 
many highlanders could not identify with the label of Igorot (Loste n.d., 
Casambre 1991, p. 58).5 
One could thus say that in both CPLA and CPA efforts to 'translate' 
the localized discourses that guided struggles against the dams in the 
Chico River and other government projects in the region, the necessary 
link through which people in the provinces could identify with the newly 
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designed discourse got lost. Part of the responses against these discourses 
by villagers suggest that their 'identification' reached beyond the local 
level, but did not surpass the areas where their vernacular was spoken. 
The fact that the Cordillera knows seven different vernaculars, must have 
been one of the problems in coming to define the Cordillerans as one kind 
of 'we.' 
One indication of this is the eruption of internal conflicts in Kalinga in 
the 1980s, that is, at the height of the anti-dams struggle. The province of 
Kalinga partly consists of mountains and partly of wide, low valleys. Since 
the 1960s, the plane of Tabuk (the capital of the Province) had become an 
immigration area of people from the neighbouring Mountain Province. 
Although the area was malaria-infested, its fertile soils attracted a great 
number of settlers who bought land in the valley. Conflicts erupted 
between Kalingas and the settlers in the 1980s, when Kalingas started to 
reclaim the area. A large number of settlers were forced to return to 
Mountain Province, under such pressure as cattle rustling and violence 
directed against persons. The Kalingas justified their actions by claiming 
that the area formed their ancestral land. On that basis, they now dis-
missed the deeds of purchase of the Mountain Province settlers to whom 
they had earlier sold the land. In this case, apparently, the oppositionist 
discourse centred around land, had escaped the confines of its application 
in the conflict with central government, and been redirected to 
'legitimize' conflicts between different groups in the Cordillera. 
These conflicts clearly point to a dilemma of the 'indigenous move-
ment' in the Cordillera. The movement acquired its regional character in 
response to the government's treatment of the region as a resource base 
for national development. This common ground of opposition against the 
central government did not, however, replace or exceed the differences 
within the region. Although a regional 'we' emerged, it remained fluid. 
Rather than a regional identity, it was an identification with the region 
that appeared in the common defense against national government imposi-
tions. 
The conflicts over the discourses of both the CPA and CPLA also show 
that although, after 1986, discourse formation became mainly an entrepre-
neurial craft, villagers still influenced the process through their responses. 
The CPA, for one, retracted the concept of Kaigorotan, but was unable to 
come up with a new concept that would appeal to all vernacular groups 
within the region. 
Conclusion 
When the Philippine government started exploration work for dams in the 
Chico River of the Cordillera in 1973, initial protest was localized. It was 
almost unimaginable, at the time, that the opposition to the dams would 
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lead to a region-wide autonomy movement whose radiation affected the 
entire country and whose mobilization networks reached United Nations' 
headquarters as well as numerous countries in the North. Yet, this was 
exactly what happened. 
This chapter has aimed to explain how this movement got its particular 
shape, which led to the discussion of discourse formation in collective 
action. In current social movement theory, collective action discourses are 
sometimes understood as prefabricated by movement entrepreneurs. The 
case of the Chico dams struggle revealed, however, how discourses 
emerge in the practice of collective action. The discourses are actor con-
structed. They arise from the practice of everyday resistance in complex 
processes of negotiation involving different groups of actors. 
Central to the collective action discourse that emerged in the Cordillera 
was the theme of 'land is life.' This theme was not a new invention. 
Prior to the struggle, the meaning of land as the inalienable heritage of 
ancestors and the residence of ancestors' spirits, was one of several 
cultural repertoires related to land. However, in response to the immediate 
threat posed by the dams, which were to inundate land to be lost forever, 
this particular repertoire became dominant and land attained, for that 
moment, an absolute value worth dying for. 
In the course of the struggle, the Tand is life' theme became elabor-
ated and the collective action discourse started to contain class-based and 
nationalist themes. These changes can be traced partly to the influence of 
the Communist Party of the Philippines, whose military wing, the New 
People's Army became a vanguard in the organization of the struggle. 
The CPP/NPA had entered the arena of struggle against the dams as a 
way to incorporate regional resistance into a nation wide revolutionary 
movement. However, through the experiences of the NPA cadres in the 
struggle and their exposure to Cordillera people and practices, some NPAs 
became increasingly convinced that the Cordillera could not be subsumed 
under a national revolution but should have a status apart, both because 
of different conditions that prevailed in the area and in order to allow 
space to traditional practices in the struggle. As a result, the newly emerg-
ing collective action discourse not only incorporated nationalist elements, 
but also regional themes that explicitly distinguished the Cordillera from 
lowland Philippines and addressed issues of discrimination against 
indigenous peoples. These regional elements were further reinforced when 
Cordillera representatives started regularly attending United Nations' 
gatherings on indigenous peoples. 
The particular ways in which the collective action discourse evolved, 
thus reflected the interaction between the nationalist NPA and local 
villagers (as well as other actors not further elaborated on). The NPA 
imprinted nationalist themes on the local discourses through their educa-
tional and organizing work, while they raised debates within the 
CPP/NPA to accommodate the regional particularities in the national 
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revolutionary movement under the influence of the local villagers. The 
emerging property of years of struggle and debates was a movement for 
regional autonomy. 
Rather than being fabricated by movement entrepreneurs, then, dis-
courses of collective action are produced through continuous iteration 
between entrepreneurs and participants, engineering and spontaneity, 
myth and 'reality.' In the Cordillera case, these tension-ridden tendencies 
met at some junction halfway through the 1980s, producing a moment 
when the movement attained its most irresistible or, depending on the 
observer, its most terrifying vibrancy. 
However, when in 1986 political opportunities for negotiating regional 
autonomy opened up, the conflicts underlying the particular direction the 
struggle had taken burst into the open and the movement split into differ-
ent factions. Each of the factions favoured a different definition of the 
situation at that moment. Moreover, each of them recreated the history of 
the movement in such a way as to claim 'ownership' over this history 
and attain a status to represent the Cordillera people vis-à-vis the national 
government. Another problem that came to the surface during this period 
was the increasing gap between discourses that defined the Cordillera as 
a unit of indigenous people, and local villagers' lack of identification with 
this region. Villagers' identification remained with smaller areas that did 
not exceed the socio-linguistic groups to which they belonged. As a 
combined result of repressive policies by the national government, and 
these conflicts and tensions within the movement, the autonomous region 
envisaged did not materialize. 
The infights that evolved between the factions point to the importance 
of discourse in informing power struggles. Collective action discourses are 
not free floating constructions, but emerge out of, and are limited by, 
concrete experiences in a historically specific struggle. Moreover, conflicts 
over discourse are not merely debates regarding the appropriate interpre-
tation of a situation. As Arce et al. have stated, 'it is in the domain of 
discourse that interaction between knowledge and power accords validity 
to images of reality' (1995, p. 156). The material presented in this chapter 
underscores the point that issues of power and control are at the heart of 
conflicts over discourse. Collective action discourses emerge out of con-
crete experiences, and contestation of discourses is a form of power 
struggle that can significantly reshape the relations between groups of 
actors. 
Notes 
1 I want to extend my heartfelt thanks to Norman Long and Pieter Hilhorst for their 
valuable comments and suggestions in the preparation of this chapter. 
2 Another question is whether identification is accessible to the observer, in other words, 
how to measure or observe consciousness? In dealing with this dilemma, Anthony Marx 
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proposes to rely on elite pronouncements and evidence of collective actions as indicators 
of identity formation, 'cognizant of the limits of this approach' (Marx 1995, p. 165). So 
will I. It would be useful, however, to bear in mind the nature of the 'elite' brought 
forward in the ensuing narrative of the Cordillera movement, especially when village 
leaders are concerned. Although maybe more affluent and influential than their co-
villagers, these people were fully engaged in everyday village life, usually non- or semi-
literate, whose pronouncements have been transcribed by movement advocates or 
recorded during my fieldwork. 
On the other hand, it seems social movements may also feed people's hidden transcripts. 
During my fieldwork in the Cordillera, for example, passing references were sometimes 
made to ideas I recognized as products of the anti-dams struggle, even among people 
never actively engaged in it. 
Florendo, for example, in discussing Cordillera involvement in the Philippine revolution 
of the end of the nineteenth century, concludes that: 'An ideology that transcended tribal 
boundaries was definitely not in accord with the conditions in the Cordillera at the 
outbreak of the Revolution. The tribus independientes were reacting to the crisis because of 
the need to ward off threat to their tribal integrity' (Florendo 1994, p. 88). 
Interestingly enough, debates about regional autonomy were mainly concerned with the 
way highlanders related to each other. The question of how lowlanders living in the 
Cordillera, estimated to comprise almost half of the Cordillera population, would be 
integrated in the autonomous region played only a minor role, unlike the Mindanao 
autonomy movement where the relation between Muslims and Christians was a central 
area of contestation (Rood 1988, 1994, p. 16; Finin 1991, p. 672). 
